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THE SHAPING OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE WIDER EUROPE 
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 39/SEPTEMBER 2003 
MICHAEL EMERSON
* 
With the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25, the new Wider Europe debate – interpreted in 
the broad sense as i n this paper – rises high up on the EU agenda, complementing the draft 
Constitution prepared by the European Convention. Together they are defining what the EU is 
to be. The Convention is defining the EU from the inside. The Wider Europe debate is 
seeking to define it by reference to its outer edges and wider neighbourhood. 
Already in March 2003, the European Commission published a first policy communication on 
the subject.
1 This has been followed by the document on European security strategy submitted 
to the European Council in June 2003 by Javier Solana,
2 the optique of which is different, but 
whose content overlaps with the Wider Europe. These two documents may be viewed as 
‘white’ or ‘green’ papers of the EU institutions. They are important references, y et highly 
preliminary and incomplete. The present document sketches a more structured policy 
framework, and makes proposals for how this might be further developed. 
1.  Primary concepts 
There is need for clearer conceptualisation of this debate. Two distinct terms are being used: 
‘Wider Europe’, and ‘Neighbourhood’. The Commission’s paper has the two confused in its 
title.  
‘Wider Europe’  can keep to the perfectly well-identified space of Council of Europe 
membership. Uncontroversially this is Europe, and all i ts peoples have a degree of 
identification with its values, history and cultures. Even the most disorderly and distant parts 
of the Wider Europe, for example the South Caucasus, have European aspirations. At the 
level of territorial coverage Wider Europe policy should  ideally embrace all the different 
categories of states and entities of Europe not already acceding to the EU or engaged in 
accession negotiations, since otherwise there will be problems of lack of coherence. In 
particular the Commission’s proposed exclusion of the Caucasus from the Wider Europe 
would need to be corrected, which the Solana paper seems already to hint at. 
Wider Europe is the space in which ‘Europeanisation’ can be said to be the general objective, 
without overtones of cultural imperialism. Europe belongs to all these peoples. 
                                                   
* The author is Senior Research Fellow and head of the Wider Europe programme at the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This paper was prepared at the invitation of the Directorate-General for 
Research of the European Parliament within the framework of the preparation of a draft report on the Wider 
Europe/New Neighbours Initiative (WE/NNI) of the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, 
Common Security and Defence Policy. The ideas in this paper will be presented in considerably greater detail in 
a paper to be published by CEPS later in 2003, which is part of a research project directed by Aspen Italia, and 
promoted by the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) in the context of the Italian Presidency of 
the European Union of the second half of 2003. CEPS’ work in this field is also supported by the Compagnia di 
San Paolo, Torino.  
1 European Commission, Wider Europe  – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003)104 final, 11.3.2003. 
2 Securing Europe in a Better World, document submitted by J. Solana to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 
19-21 June 2003.    MICHAEL EMERSON 
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‘Europeanisation’ has become a special form of modernisation for the formerly communist 
and fascist dictatorships, as well as the still weak states of Europe. It is a process that all 
Europeans may consider that they own and with which they can identify. The distinction is 
made between accession to EU membership (as a formal legal and political act) and 
Europeanisation as a wider process of political, economic and societal transformation. The 
ideology of Europeanisation appears to be democratic, liberal (of social-democratic colour), 
non-hegemonic, multinational and multi-cultural, inclusive and integrative. 
Europeanisation may be seen as working through three types of mechanisms:3 
•  precise legal obligations coming indeed from preparing for accession to the EU and 
acceding to the Council of Europe (which effectively serves as the EU’s human rights 
training school and enforcement agency),  
•  through changing the beliefs, expectations and identity of the individual (regional/ethnic, 
national, European), and  
•  changing domestic rules of the game in politics and business, altering the strategic 
position of domestic actors. 
Synthesising these mechanisms of economics, politics, law and sociology is the vital yet 
subjective will of the individual, political parties and interest groups to accept or even push 
for the adoption of European norms of business and politics. The key mechanism of Wider 
Europe strategy may be viewed to be ‘Europeanisation’ as here defined. For a more  vivid 
view of Europeanisation, one may take the words of a Bosnian politician: 
The EU leverage is identification of the EU in the (Balkan) region as an area with 
security, jobs, a decent and rising standard of living, the rule of law upheld by 
accountable, democratic, clean public institutions, and a system of minorities 
protected by law, not by the carving out of territories….  Without recognition that 
the future of the region is in the EU, there is no chance for the implementation of 
a coherent plan. Not only the political elite, military officers, intelligentsia, but 
also the majority of the public should share this opinion. For the first time all the 
countries from the region, even the participants in the recently ended conflict, are 
attempting to join the European mainstream (excerpted from a  paper by former 
Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic). 
Europe’s ‘Neighbourhood’ goes wider. To the South and South-East it embraces first of all 
the Mediterranean states of the Maghreb and Mashrek, which are already subjects of the 
heavily structured Barcelona process.  These states link to the rest of the Middle East, 
however, including the Gulf states, and these link on to Afghanistan. Europe’s neighbourhood 
extends to the East to Russia’s neighbours of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia, as now 
represented politically by the map of OSCE membership. This vast belt of territory and 
peoples may be called the Greater Middle East. 
From North Africa to Central Asia this is the Muslim world (with the singular exception of 
Israel), which today has become Europe’s main source of security threats, linking the hazards 
of terrorism, trafficking, illegal immigration, weapons of mass destruction and cultural and 
ideological confrontations. Westerners recommend to this vast region variants of their liberal 
democratic model. But neither the West – the  US and Europe  – nor the countries of this 
region themselves have clear ideas of how these non-democratic regimes may be reformed 
                                                   
3 For a presentation of the concepts and application to southern Europe , see K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias , 
eds., Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery, Frank Cass, London, 2001.    THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
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and perhaps transformed. The sensitivity to cultural imperialism is so acute that it connects 
with the discourse of the Islamic fundamentalist hyper-terrorist.  
While the United States becomes less of an external actor in the Wider Europe as the EU 
widens and deepens, it remains the leading external actor in much of the Greater Middle East. 
The issue of coherence and coordination between the EU and US policies is crucial for the 
Greater Middle East, especially in view of the divergences of ideology recently on display 
between Washington’s neo-conservative elements and most Europeans. This also means that 
North America, or the transatlantic community (coherent or incoherent as the case may be), 
has also to be regarded as part of Europe’s neighbourhood.    
The more precise and logical terminology for the Wider Europe debate might then be to say 
that the ‘Wider Europe’ is indeed Europe (of the Council of Europe map), whereas its wider 
neighbourhood consists of the ‘Greater Middle East’ – see Figure 1  on the front cover. North 
America may be viewed as part of Europe’s neighbourhood too, but in the present context, 
this concerns mainly the United States as actor in the Greater Middle East. The whole subject 
may for convenience be called the ‘Wider Europe’, but only as shorthand for the ‘Wider 
Europe and its Neighbourhood in the Greater Middle East’.  
2.  Five arguments driving a Wider Europe strategy 
For the continent of Europe  ‘Europeanisation’ is an idealistic argument, since security threats 
from within this Wider Europe are now  much reduced and the ideology is c ommonly 
understood. For the Greater Middle East the matters of ideology are not settled and for the 
West the realist argument is to limit security threats, which means that the EU and the US 
have to try to work together there. These distinctions, both territorial and ideological, are of 
course only approximate, and there are fuzzy borders between the continents in places, and to 
a degree ideology has universal foundations. But still the distinction between these first two 
arguments – the idealist and the realist – is categorical, and has crucial policy implications.  
Thirdly,  the efficiency argument searches for the most effective organisation of policy spaces 
in a complex continental region, and the optimal distribution of jurisdictions and powers by 
level  of government in multi-tier settings. For some policies, or economic networks and 
infrastructures, geography will be a dominant factor, such as river basins or seas. But for other 
policies political commonalities are far more important. Also there is the search for the most 
efficient blend of multilateral structures and bilateral relations.  
Fourthly, there is a circumstantial argument alongside these three timeless arguments. The 
current huge expansion of the EU to 25 member states is going to take years to digest 
institutionally. Yet there is already a list of further potential candidates. While the prospect of 
EU accession is the strongest incentive for Europeanisation, the EU’s Wider Europe policy 
seeks to extend this influence as far as possible without full membership for the time being.  
Fifthly, there is the comparative advantage argument.  The EU’s still fragile and incomplete 
foreign policy system also underlines the need for the EU to make a credible job of what it 
can do best in the broad field of external relations. This means Europeanisation of its 
neighbourhood in the first place, more than global power projection. Wider Europe policy 
may be a key to resuming progress towards common foreign, security and defence policies 
after the devastating split caused by the Iraq war.  
3.  Images of variable geometry 
Since Wider Europe policy is going to be highly complex in practice, it needs some 
simplifying images (see Figure 2 ).   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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Figure 2. Model types for the organisation of a complex region 
 
•  The hub-and-spoke system represents bilateral relations between a leading power and many smaller states or 
entities. 
•  The cobweb system is where there are successive concentric circles of state and entities surrounding (or 
neighbouring, or dependent on) the leading power, but where there are multilateral relations around each 
circle as well as bilateral relations with the leading power. 
•  The matrix  represents the disaggregation of the relations between a leading power and a complex region by 
policy domain and by state or ent ity.  
•  The Rubik cube represents the same matrix where there is more than one leading power. 
A dominating power (or hegemon), be it global or regional, naturally tends towards hub-and-
spoke systems. However each bilateral relationship between hub and spoke  may be broken 
down into its various policy dimensions and sectors, which is certainly relevant for the 
specific case of the EU and its neighbours. This suggests a matrix. In practice for the EU and 
the Wider Europe one can identify in the geographic aspect numerous states or entities of the 
Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East beyond the EU of 25 member states. The EU (25) 
of 450 million population represents only a little over half of the population of the Wider 
Europe (of the Council of Europe map), b ut about 90% of its national income. The Greater   THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
  5 
Middle East adds almost 400 million more in population, but only another 10% in national 
income (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Summary statistics of Wider Europe and its neighbourhood, 2001 data 
  Number 
of states 
Population, 
(millions) 
National income 
($ billions) 
Wider Europe       
EU  25  450  8,500 
Other West Europe, EEA/EFTA & micro-states   8  12  433 
EU candidates  3  96  219 
Other South-East Europe, SAA states  5  24  43 
European states of CIS  7  225  313 
Non-recognised secessionist entities  4  3   
Total, Wider Europe   52  810  9,508 
       
Greater Middle East       
Mediterranean  10  174  255 
Gulf (GCC), Iraq, Iran  9  135  590 
Central Asia, Afghanistan  6  83  41 
Total, Greater Middle East  25  392  886 
       
Total, Wider Europe and Greater Middle East  78  1,202  10,394 
 
As regards the policy aspect, seven major policy dimensions are identified, as in Table 2. The 
huge number of cells in the matrix is more than can receive individualised attention. In order 
to simplify the system there has to be recourse to multilateral relations between the EU and 
groups of neighbours, for which the image of concentric circles is often referred to. However 
in practice the system becomes a blend of bilateral and multilateral features, for which the 
cobweb image serves better.  
Yet even this subtler image encounters a further complication when there  is more than one 
hub, with overlapping spokes and cobwebs. This is the case with respect to the EU,  the US 
and Russia in parts of the Wider Europe, and especi ally in the Greater Middle East. The very 
idea of overlapping cobwebs becomes so complicated that such systems are hardly likely to 
be sustainable in practice. Either one hub dominates, or the hubs coordinate. For this the 
Rubik cube image is suggested, adding a third dimension to the matrix.
4 Solutions are possible 
but of course difficult to organise.  
These images lead on to the substance. The Wider Europe may tend towards a cobweb system 
around the EU. For the Greater Middle East either the US, the EU and Russia find Rubik cube 
solutions, or the influence of the lesser hubs will be secondary or of a token nature. 
                                                   
4 For a detailed application of this model see M. Emerson and N. Tocci, The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle 
East, CEPS, 2003.   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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Table 2. Simplified matrix of the Wider Europe and its neighbourhood 
  Political & human dimension  Economic dimension  Security dimension 
  Democracy & 
human rights 
Education, culture 
& research 
European 
economic area 
European 
monetary area 
European infrastructure 
& network area 
Freedom, security 
& justice 
Cooperation in 
external security 
Wider Europe               
1. EEA/EFTA & micro states               
2. Accession candidates               
3. Balkans (SAA states)                
4. European PCA/CIS states                
    4a. Russia               
    4b. Bel/Ukr/Mold               
    4b. Caucasus               
Greater Middle East               
5. Mediterranean               
    5a. Maghreb               
    5b. Mashrek               
6. Gulf (GCC), Iraq, Iran               
7. Central Asia & Afghanistan               
Pan-European areas               
8. Council of Europe map               
9. OSCE, EBRD, NATO-PfP               
Overlapping regions                
10. Baltic Sea               
11. Black Sea               
12. Mediterranean Sea               
   THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
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4.  Common European spaces 
While Wider Europe policy can be approached from either the bilateral or thematic sides of 
the matrix, here the thematic approach is preferred as the place to start. There are already 
lively but rather chaotic discussions underway about common European policy spaces, which 
take place mainly in the bilateral dialogue between the two European hubs – the EU and 
Russia. This debate deserves to be become more open and inclusive. One may start with the 
three large ‘dimensions’ following the OSCE and the Stability Pact for South East Europe, as 
in Table 2. However these may best be broken down into seven main groups of policies to be 
tractable in  operational  terms. Here the several spaces adopted in EU-Russian discussions are 
retained, completed by two additional and highly important ‘spaces’ (democracy and human 
rights, and monetary affairs). Each space is now identified and commented on very briefly. 
A. Political and human dimension 
•  A common space of democracy and human rights. Here the Council of Europe is well 
placed to work alongside the EU as a key partner in the Wider Europe. Priority should be 
given to the least ordered states of the Council of Europe. 
•  A space of education, culture and research. EU programmes are rightly being opened 
increasingly to the Wider Europe. There should be no conditionality beyond quality, 
given that these investments are looking decades ahead. 
B. Economic dimension 
•  A European economic area (for trade and market regulations). The EU should propose 
an open -ended multilateral Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA) and develop a 
modular approach for progressive inclusion in the EU single market, with a restructuring 
of existing EEA/EFTA institutions.
5 
•  A European monetary area (for euro and macroeconomic matters). The EU’s official 
documents are still ignoring the inevitable extension of the euro into the Wider Europe. 
Its doctrine is excessively restrictive even in the conditions for the new acceding states, 
whereas for non-acceding states and entities the policy line needs to be more open and 
reasoned (some micro-states and sub-state entities are already fully euroised).6 
•  A European infrastructure and network area. Pan-European networks in transport, energy 
(oil and gas pipelines, electricity grids) and telecommunications are being developed with 
EU/EIB/EBRD financial support, f or which the overriding condition should be the 
economic efficiency of the network as a whole. 
C. Security dimension 
•  A common space of freedom, security and justice. Powerful incentives can be offered to 
the individual states of the Wider Europe, offering increasing freedom of movement of 
persons (visas and immigration), in exchange for improved border controls and domestic 
law and order. 
                                                   
5 For a critique of recent EU-Russian discussions about a Common European Economic Space, see Carl B. 
Hamilton,  Russia’s European Economic Integration  – Escapism and Realities,  working paper, Stockholm 
School of Economics, April 2003. 
6 For a critique of present EU policies, see C. Wyplosz,  “Who’s Afraid of Euroisation?”, CEPS Commentary, 
www.ceps.be, 19 June 2003.   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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•   A space of cooperation in the field of external security. EU instruments of security and 
defence policy  are developing, and can support the Europeanisation process in the still 
unstable parts of the Wider Europe. 
5.  Institutions and organisations 
The Wider Europe needs an adequate multilateral institutional structure, which the European 
Union has the main responsibility for devising. The European Conference may be usefully 
retained as a standing conference for dialogue on the Wider Europe agenda, but this very thin 
and ad hoc arrangement should be reformed. It should be opened to all the member states of 
the Council of Europe, and to a degree linked to this organisation, with which the EU already 
increasingly develops practical cooperation on topics relevant for Wider Europe policy.7 
Regional structures should be supported, where they have both geographic rationale and 
political value. The Baltic, Barents and Mediterranean Seas have seen the development of 
substantial regional structures, as is also the case for South-East Europe. The political concept 
of ‘dimensions’, as in the Northern Dimension, seeks to build up the concept of regional 
cooperation into something more political. The Black Sea (BSEC organisation) is the main 
instance of neglect by the EU, which deserves to be corrected given that EU candidate states 
now account for half of its coastline, and because of significant policy interests (energy 
supplies, security and conflict resolution).  
The key  EU-Russia strategic partnership develops already quite fast, and could be 
strengthened institutionally, for example with the aid of a joint EU-Russian Council of 
Ministers.  
For the rest of the Wider Europe the EU should take a fresh look at its complicated array of 
association arrangements, which presently include association agreements with states, 
association with overseas countries (i.e. not states) and territories, and with other entities in 
Europe having close relationships with EU member states. These arrangements, themselves 
needing clearer classification in legal and political terms, should be opened up to serve the 
needs of various sub-state entities, as well as Europe’s advanced micro-states and entities, and 
those emerging from conflict situations. One can conceive of ways of including associated 
states partially into the EU institutional system, to the point where the most advanced states 
may become virtual member states.
8 Participatory arrangements could in principle be devised 
for all the institutions, with examples suggested in Box 1. The only red line that cannot be 
crossed before acceding to full membership status would seem to be a voting seat at the table 
of the Council of Ministers (one might  also  add having a Member of the European 
Commission, if all member states are to continue to be represented in future). 
The C ommission has proposed a new category of  ‘Neighbourhood Agreements’, to be 
preceded by Action Plans. The Convention has proposed agreements that would ‘develop 
special relationship(s) with neighbouring states’. The Commission makes ‘full 
implementation’ of existing agreements a precondition for any new development, but this is 
                                                   
7 The 19
th Quadripartite meeting between the EU and the Council of Europe took place on 17 June 2003, with 
EU (Greek) Council Presidency, the Commission, and the Secretary General and (Moldovan) Chairman in office 
and of the Council of Europe. The concluding statement is itself an illustration of Wider Europe policy at work.  
Its headings include: EU enlargement, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood, European Convention, South Caucasus, 
Moldova, SouthEast Europe, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia, Russia, Belarus, Migration, International 
Criminal Court.  
8 For a detailed account of how the EEA system works, see M.  Emerson, M. Vahl and S. Woolcock, Navigating 
by the Stars – Norway, the EU and the European Economic Area, CEPS Paperback, 2002.    THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
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so vague as to be virtually meaningless, and certainly devoid of incentive effect at this stage. 
This ‘full implementation’ condition should be dropped, also since the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements for CIS states (for example) have in any case become increasingly 
obsolete, as the EU’s own policies have developed and the states in question become 
increasingly differentiated.  
Box 1. Possible mechanisms for partial participation in EU institutions by associated states 
and territories 
•  European Parliament. Inclusion in a neighbouring constituency of a member state (for a micro 
state/entity), or an observer or full member (where population reaches average constituency size) 
•  European Commission. A Commissioner will have relations with the associated states and entities 
in his portfolio of tasks 
•  Council of Ministers. A member state chosen by the associated state or entity may be mandated to 
speak on its behalf. In the voting of the Council of Ministers under the double majority proposed 
by the Convention, the mandated member state may cast the population vote of the associated state 
or entity separately. A representative of the associated state or entity may attend as observer within 
the delegation of the mandated member state in open legislative sessions 
•  European Court of Justice. Full jurisdiction 
•  Economic and Social  Committee. An observer (for micro-states and entities), or full member 
(where the population reaches average European Parliament constituency size) 
•  Committee of the Regions. As for the Economic and Social Committee 
•  European Investment Bank. Full eligibility for project financing 
•  European Central Bank. Fully part of the euro area, but with no seat on the Governing Council of 
the European Central Bank; possibility for limited minting of euro coins (e.g. Monaco euro) 
•  Citizenship. Citizens have full rights as for member states; passports may bear the identification 
‘European Union’, followed by the name and symbol of the entity, and possibly a triple identity 
where the entity has a special relationship in or with a member state* 
•  Agencies of the EU**. Participation may be granted if useful. 
•  Staffing in the EU institutions. Eligibility for staff appointments on the basis of merit. 
 
*For example citizens of the Åland Islands carry passports whose cover page indicates the triple identification of 
EU, Finland and Åland. 
**For example, agencies of the EU include: 
•  European Environment Agency 
•  European Training Foundation 
•  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug-Addiction 
•  European Monitoring centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
•  Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
•  Agency for Safety and Health at Work 
 
The  Action Plan idea should not just be focused on what the states of the Wider Europe 
should do to conform better to EU norms, as if the process were just a weaker version of the 
regular reports produced for accession candidates, for which the reference is complete 
adoption of the  acquis. For the Wider Europe the EU itself has t o propose ideas for the 
common European spaces, and to process these into policy commitments, in order to establish 
the references and incentives for the process. This should be based on a comprehensive series 
of Green or White Papers for the Wider Europe, one each for the seven common European 
policy  spaces identified above, with further papers on  a) institutional issues including 
association arrangements,  b) regional organisations structures and  c) economic aid (see   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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below). The Action Plans for individual  states of the Wider Europe could then be structured 
along the lines of the common European  policy  spaces, reviewing opportunities and 
performance under each heading. The Action Plans should also review institutional issues, in 
the light of possible new categories of association arrangements for states, countries and 
territories.  
The total of ten White or Green Papers may seem a lot, but  the figure  should not be 
surprising. The subject matter is extremely complex if a comprehensive list of common 
European policy spaces is to be pursued seriously. More precisely one could imagine separate 
Green Papers being prepared by each of the concerned directorates general of the Commission 
according to common guidelines, to be submitted for debate with partner states of the Wider 
Europe as well as EU member states, with the Commission then to draw up an overarching 
Wider Europe White Paper.   
Economic aid from the EU is granted on the basis of an exceedingly complex set of 
differentiated rules and regulations for aid to states of different groups. These should be made 
more user-friendly for the context of the Wider Europe, notably for projects overlapping 
neighbouring states falling into different political categories. The Commission published in 
July 2003 a second Communication with proposals going in this direction, and also proposing 
a New Neighbourhood Instrument post-2006. 9 The conditionality question needs systematic 
consideration. Aid allocations should be partly conditional on policies of the partner 
government, but there should be important exceptions for long-term investments whose time 
horizons extend way beyond political terms of office, as for example  in education 
programmes and pan-European network infrastructures. 
6.  Wider  Europe and conflict resolution 
The Wider Europe policy framework should reach out to the most disorderly zones of the 
European periphery, especially to the South East, from the Balkans to the Caucasus. The EU 
is uniquely well placed to introduce a quasi-constitutional element, and indeed vision, to aid 
resolution of the ethno-secessionist conflicts that erupted with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and disintegration of Yugoslavia. A systemic view of the possibilities is set out in Box 
2, which distinguishes three or four tier multi-tier governance systems (sub-state, state, 
region, EU supranational (or multilateral, with a wider coalition of external powers and 
organisations). In particular an overarching EU tier of governance may be decisive in 
stabilising conflict-prone and weak states and en tities of the Wider Europe, in some cases 
holding together fragile federative structures. Such solutions should be considered a normal 
part of the constitutional system in ethnically complex regions, for both advanced and 
peaceful societies (e.g. Belgium) as well as those that unfortunately succumbed to civil war 
before being able to return to peace and reconciliation. Variants on this three (or four tier) 
model have been proposed (and almost accepted in 2003) for Cyprus, and the new (still 
fragile) Union of Serbia and Montenegro may be interpreted in this light too. 
For the EU to extend its vision of the Wider Europe to these still disordered parts means 
retain the possible use of a full range of arrangements typically used by a major power: the 
protectorate, the associated state and integration. Annexation  is excluded from the politically 
acceptable methods of modern democracies, but is included in the taxonomy of  Box 3  for 
completeness since the idea is not so out of context in some cases (e.g. Turkey/Cyprus, 
Russia/Abkhazia). 
 
                                                   
9 European Commission, Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, Com (2003) final, 1 July 2003.   THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
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Box 2. Taxonomy of solutions to ethno-secessionist conflicts 
One tier – Secession and/or unitary state(s)  
1.  Secession denied, unitary state prevails 
2.  Secession and independence, recognised internationally  
3.  De facto secession and independence, non-recognised  
Two tier – with federative solutions 
4.  Federation (one state in international law, decentralised powers) 
5.  Confederation (two states in international law, some common policies) 
6.  Common state (one state in international law, some common policies) 
Three tier – with regional cooperation  
7.  Regional community of two or more states and sub-state entities) 
Four tier – with role of supranational or external powers  
8.  Multilateral, e.g. OSCE/UN/Council of Europe 
9.  ‘Europeanisation’/‘Russification’/‘Pax Americana’ (for overarching 
protection/association/integration/annexation) 
10. Coalition/consortium/condominion,  e.g. EU and Russia, or troika of EU-RUS-US 
 
Box 3. On protectorates, association, integration and annexation 
o  Protectorate. An external power keeps the peace with the aid of military or police forces as 
necessary, and may also exercise powers of civil administration. The external power may be 
invited or uninvited, which means different degrees of democratic legitimacy.  
o  Association. A self-governing entity adopts some or even many of the policies and laws of an 
external power, usually its much bigger neighbour, but without becoming part of the political 
structure of the neighbour. This regime derives its legitimacy from being voluntarily sought or 
accepted.  
o  Integration. The entity voluntarily becomes a full part of the economic and political structures 
and jurisdiction of the (formerly ‘external’) power.  
o  Annexation. When this integration happens through the use or threat of force, or without the 
consent of the parties directly concerned, or the legitimising agreement of the international 
community. 
7.  The Greater Middle East 
Even before the Iraq war there was a growing movement of ideas among Arab scholars in 
favour of the region’s progressive democratisation as a key to modernisation and 
development.
10 The UNDP report in 2002, written by Arab scholars, provided a template 
document, with a focus on the three deficits – of freedom, women’s empowerment and human 
capabilities and knowledge.
11 
Faced with the issue how to respond, several models of Western policy may be identified: 
•  Model 1.  Acquiescence, with priority given to regime stability, even when the regime is 
authoritarian and repressive. A blind eye is turned to objectionable regime features. It is 
now appreciated that such regimes have not only failed to deliver economic and social 
progress, but have de facto contributed to the environment that produced the new global 
terrorism. The conclusion has to be that the time has run out for Model 1.  
                                                   
10 Fares Al-Braizat, The EU and Democracy Promotion in the Southern Mediterranean – Is it working?, CEPS 
Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper No. 5, CEPS, forthcoming, 2003.  
11 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report, UN, New York, 2002.   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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•  Model 2. Passive engagement, with political dialogue over democratic values and human 
rights, but without significant incentive measures or pressures over democratic values and 
human rights. Economic development is seen as a forerunner to democratisation. This has 
been the EU’s approach under the Barcelona process so far, which has some merits, but 
has not seen impressive results.   
•  Model 3. Active engagement, in a more holistic approach, calling for political, economic 
and human development in parallel, strengthening the emphasis on democratic values and 
human rights, with more significant incentives. This may be the model for the period 
ahead, but it has so far not been really tested in the region.12 
•  Model 4. Hostile engagement, against objectionable regimes. This includes sanctions but 
can bring in a wider arsenal of diplomatic measures. The track record of sanctions policies 
world-wide is uneven to say the least, and the reverse logic of counterproductive effect is 
well known. However the pre-war sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime had some 
success as containment. 
•  Model 5. Forceful regime change, meaning war in the extreme case, or political pressures 
backed by credible threats of force. Bombing, invasion and military occupation are the 
models of Afghanistan 2 001 and Iraq 2003. But the workings of this model for 
establishing sustainable democracy and modernisation remain uncertain and hazardous. 
Even today the military occupation of Afghanistan is judged so hazardous that it is 
confined to the capital, whereas in Iraq resistance to the occupation becomes ominous.  
8.  Recalibrating the Barcelona process 
The EU could plausibly recalibrate its Barcelona policy from Model 2 to Model 3, and may 
already be inclined to do so gradually.13 However it is in the nature of the partnership concept 
that this be done with the aid of incentives, and not force. The US, in the shadow of the war 
with Iraq, develops a Middle East Partnership Initiative, which is similar to the Barcelona 
process in combining technical assistance (to education, business development and 
democratisation) with trade policy initiatives (bilateral free trade agreements). The financing 
and trade flows on the US side remain small by comparison with the EU. US policies are here 
switching from Model 1 to Model 3, while its main action has been in the switch for Iraq from 
Model 4 to Model 5, with threats of the same for Iran. The EU has also shifted its position 
implicitly over Iran closer to the US position, in acknowledging the possible legitimacy of use 
of force to stop  the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (moving here to somewhere 
between Models 3 and 4). 
The prospects for EU-US coherence at the strategic level are therefore not non-existent,14 yet 
they depend on two essential conditions: resolution of the Israel i-Palestinian conflict and the 
outcome of the Iraq war. For the US these two theatres of operation seem to be linked through 
the need for the US to rescue the calamitous state of its public reputation in the Arab world, 
                                                   
12 See R. Youngs, The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World, CEPS Middle East and 
Euro-Med Working Paper No. 2, 2002. 
13 This is being advocated by Commissioner Chris Patten in “Democracy Doesn’t Flow from the Barrel of a 
Gun”, Foreign Policy, September-October 2003. 
14 Obvious opportunities for coordination exist between the EU Barcelona process and the US -Middle East 
Partnership Initiative launched by Secretary of State Powell in December 2002, with the intention of supporting 
a wide range of educational, governance and private sector developments. The initial budget of $20 million, 
which can only support pilot schemes, is to be increased to $145 million next year, which would remain however 
only a small contribution.    THE SHAPING OF A  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIDER  EUROPE 
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its public opinion approval ratings having fallen virtually to zero in some cases. For the EU 
the belated turn of the attention of the US administration to the Israel i-Palestinian conflict 
with the aid of the Quartet’s Roadmap  was welcomed, although the process seems to be 
deeply f lowed. For Iraq the risk now is that conflict between the people and the occupying 
powers degenerates to the point that this theatre of operations may be taking over from the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories as touchstone for Arab resentment towards the 
West.  
It may be that the US and its coalition partners will extricate themselves from Iraq once some 
kind of improvement on the Saddam Hussein regime has been established, possibly with the 
UN taking over responsibility for the transition to self-government. The EU itself can hardly 
determine the outcome at all directly. However it can continue a Wider Middle East policy 
mainly in the sense identified above (Model 3), with  a focus on both state-building and 
region-building. The EU has already signalled a partial convergence of its security strategy in 
the direction of the US, the Solana document having acknowledged the possible use of force, 
on condition of multilateral legitimacy, to remove threats of weapons of mass destruction 
conditions. 
If there was some breakthrough over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  is achieved, the road 
would  be open to renew the drive in favour of regional cooperation. While the Barcelona 
process embraces the whole Mediterranean basin, in a next stage the EU could foster deeper 
sub-regional cooperation  with the Mashreq and Maghreb regions. It could offer the 
perspective of institutional developments that could be more jointly owned, correcting in 
some degree the highly asymmetric Barcelona process, which has no organisation of its own, 
relying entirely on the institutions of the EU. The ideas of forming Euro-Mashreq and Euro -
Maghreb  Communities can be sketched. The enlargement of the EU way into the 
Mediterranean with the accession of Cyprus and Malta opens new opportunities. The EU 
could for example propose that a new Euro-Mashrek Community have headquarter facilities 
(secretariat, etc.) based in Cyprus, and the Euro-Maghreb Community similar facilities in 
Malta. The EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relationship also holds out prospects for further 
development. As and when decisive progress is made in the Middle East peace process, Israel 
should be offered advanced association possibilities (official discussions between Israel and 
the EU over possible accession to the European Economic Area apparently  have already 
begun).15 
This recalibration of the Barcelona process, with increasingly important Maghreb and 
Mashrek sub-regional components, would  see this process  as the leading element of EU 
policy towards the Greater Middle  East, rather than a lagging and somewhat incongruous 
element of the Wider Europe. 
9.  Summary 
This paper proposes recalibrating, clarifying and further developing the initial policy ideas of 
the EU on the Wider Europe in the following directions:  
￿  Distinguishing between the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East. 
                                                   
15 See A. Tovias, Mapping Israel’s Policy Options regarding its Future Institutionalised Relations with the 
European Union, CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Working  Paper No. 3, March 2003, and M.  Emerson and N. 
Tocci, op. cit. See also Financial Times, “EU seeks closer Israel partnership”, 18 June 2003.   MICHAEL EMERSON 
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￿  Identifying the Wider Europe more closely with the Council of Europe, using its 
membership map as a defining characteristic, which also establishes the basis of common 
norms of democracy and human rights. 
￿  Adopting a comprehensive view of this continental Wider Europe, embracing all states 
and entities other than those that are already negotiating accession, and certainly including 
the weakest states and entities of the region (e.g. to include the Caucasus and signal 
opportunities for Belarus in due course). 
￿  Providing a systematic framework and incentives for the bilateral Action Plans proposed 
by the Commission,  
o  developing the ideas of common European policy spaces into operational propositions, 
seven of which may be identified, and for each of which the Commission should 
prepare a Green or White Paper, and 
o  taking a fresh look at actual and conceivable categories of institutional association of 
states and entities of the Wider Europe with the EU, to provide maximum incentives 
for the Europeanisation without or before full accession. 
￿  Shifting in this way the balance between bilateral and regional/multilateral approaches to 
a degree in favour of the latter. 
￿  Recalibrating the model of EU policies for the Barcelona process and the Greater Middle 
East in a more holistic approach, with greater emphasis on democratic values and human 
rights alongside economic reform and human development, and seeking to re-establish 
effective partnership with the US in this direction. 
￿  Focusing increasingly on sub-regional formats in the Greater Middle East (Maghreb, 
Mashrek, Gulf), with new possibilities for the Mashrek now becoming conceivable with 
progress on the Roadmap for the peace process. 
￿  Exploiting opportunities of the E U’s enlargement way into the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean, with proposing Malta and Cyprus respectively as headquarter locations for 
new Euro-Maghreb Community and Euro -Mashrek Community organisations, whose 
structures would be more symmetrical than embodied in the present Barcelona process.  
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